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A B S T R A C T   
Most people recognise and match pictures of familiar faces effortlessly, while struggling to match unfamiliar face 
images. This has led to the suggestion that true human expertise for faces applies only to familiar faces. This 
paper develops that idea to propose that we have isolated ‘islands of expertise’ surrounding each familiar face 
that allow us to perform better with faces that resemble those we already know. This idea is tested in three 
experiments. The first shows that familiarity with a person facilitates identification of their relatives. The second 
shows that people are better able to remember faces that resemble someone they already know. The third shows 
that while prompting participants to think about resemblance at study produces a large positive effect on sub-
sequent recognition, there is still a significant effect if there is no such prompt. Face-space-R (Lewis, 2004) is 
used to illustrate a possible computational explanation of the processes involved.   
1. Introduction 
“He looks just like his Dad” is a saying common enough to suggest 
that people can, or at least believe they can, spot family resemblances. In 
objective tests, however, our ability to do so is poorer than we might 
suppose. Performance is above chance but far from perfect (e.g. 
Alvergne et al., 2009; Dal Martello & Maloney, 2006; Nesse, Silverman, 
& Bortz, 1990). A key difference may be that we know the Dad in 
question, but the objective tests use faces that are unfamiliar to their 
participants. The ‘islands of expertise’ theory developed here posits that 
this familiarity is crucial: it enables us to see the likeness of relatives 
more clearly and to better process other faces that resemble those 
already known to us. 
Studies of face matching and recognition have shown a radical dif-
ference in ability between familiar and unfamiliar faces. For example, 
Burton, Wilson, Cowan, and Bruce (1999) found that familiarity with the 
individuals shown in poor-quality video footage changed recognition 
performance from barely above chance to almost ceiling. The difference 
is qualitative; the task demands are quite different. For familiar faces, a 
matching study becomes a question of whether you can recognise that 
the images show the same person (they are both pictures of person X). 
The test phase of memory studies requires identification of the indi-
vidual shown and deciding whether they were in the study set. The 
recognition process presumably involves comparing the new face with 
some form of stored representation. For unfamiliar faces, there is no 
existing representation to compare it with. Instead, participants tend to 
resort to feature matching, looking for a particular mole or at the hair-
line. The more different the two faces are in terms of lighting, orienta-
tion etc., the harder the task becomes (Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000; 
Johnston & Edmonds, 2009). 
The differences between familiar and unfamiliar face processing led 
Megreya and Burton (2006) to claim that’Unfamiliar faces are not faces’. 
Their evidence included the observation that performance on matching 
of inverted faces is strongly correlated with performance on upright 
faces for unfamiliar, but not familiar faces. The claim is arguably too 
strong. Unfamiliar faces do show effects that suggest they are indeed 
processed as whole faces, such as the part-whole illusion (Hole, 1994). 
Changing the bottom half of a face image affects the perception of the 
top half even for unfamiliar faces. 
The question of the extent to which we are general face experts is 
hotly debated. It is argued that we gradually develop expertise in faces 
(Carey, 1992) and that this expertise accounts for phenomena such as 
the other race effect and inversion (Rhodes, Hayward, & Winkler, 2006). 
It has been likened to expertise in other domains such as birds and cars 
(Curby & Gauthier, 2009; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 
2000). However, while phenomena such as the part-whole illusion 
suggest that there is some specialised processing for unfamiliar faces, 
Young and Burton (2018) argue that we are only truly expert with 
familiar faces. For example, Saether and Laeng (2008) found that the 
parents of identical twins, while able to identify their own children 
easily, were no better than average at distinguishing other sets of twins. 
An implication of having true expertise only for familiar faces is that 
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we will each have ‘islands of expertise’, located in those regions of ‘face 
space’ (Valentine, 1991) corresponding to the faces that we know. The 
proposal in this paper is that, when an unfamiliar face is similar to a 
known face, it will inherit some of the associated expertise. That is, we 
should be better able to process faces that resemble someone we know. 
This proposal can account for some of the apparent expertise shown with 
unfamiliar faces. For example, the other-race effect can be explained 
because, by definition, we know fewer faces of the ‘other race’ and 
therefore have fewer islands of expertise in that region of face space. A 
given unfamiliar face is therefore less likely to look anything like a 
familiar face and reverts to relatively inexpert, unfamiliar face 
processing. 
The idea is tested here in three experiments. The first considers our 
ability to identify relatives of a target face, depending on whether we are 
familiar with the target (i.e. do we know the Dad in question?). The 
second and third experiments look at effects in a face memory task of 
whether the faces to be remembered resemble previously known iden-
tities. Finally, a potential computational account is outlined, in terms of 
the Lewis Face-space-R model (Lewis, 2004). 
2. Experiment 1 
There has been a long study of human abilities to do kin recognition, 
partly driven by theories relating to paternal uncertainty. The argument 
is that babies might resemble their fathers more than their mothers, in 
order to reassure the father that it is indeed his child. Christenfeld and 
Hill (1995) reported that one year old children were indeed rated as 
resembling their father more than their mother. The downside of any 
such putative adaptation would be what happens if in fact the child 
resembles someone else. Bredart and French (1999) therefore argue that 
a baby should resemble both parents equally, on average. They failed to 
replicate the increased resemblance to fathers reported by Christenfeld 
and Hill (1995). Rather than rating resemblance, they simply asked 
participants to pick the parent from a line-up of three images. Given 
pictures of children aged 1, 3 or 5, Bredart and French found perfor-
mance to be between 7% and 14% better than the chance performance 
of 33%. People still made mistakes more than half the time. 
Using pictures of new born babies, Mclain, Setters, Moulton, and 
Pratt (2000) found an advantage for identifying the correct mother from 
a line-up of three images. Bressan and Grassi (2004) speculate that a 
possible reason for the different results in the three studies is that 
Christenfeld and Hill asked participants to rate resemblance on a scale 
from 1 to 10, while the other two asked them to identify the correct 
match. Bressan and Grassi therefore argue that strategies may differ 
between the two tasks, with matching being decided on a possibly 
idiosyncratic feature such as dimples, while overall similarity remains 
relatively low. 
Bressan and Dal Martello (2002) argued that people’s perceived 
ability to see family likeness between parent and child is influenced by 
assumed knowledge of the relationship. In real life, parents and children 
are often seen together. Believing that they are thus related may affect 
how similar they appear. To test this idea, they asked for ratings of 
similarity between adult-infant pairs with information about relatedness 
as a controlled variable. Although the (spurious) information about 
relatedness did not affect accuracy, they found that it was the strongest 
predictor of rated similarity. Average similarity ratings were higher for 
non-related pairs incorrectly labelled as related than they were for 
genuinely related pairs labelled as unrelated. The finding has been 
repeated for a Japanese image set by Oda, Matsumoto-Oda, and Kura-
shima (2005), who got a larger effect size for their label than for genuine 
relatedness. So perhaps our perception that we can see family re-
semblances stems from already knowing the answer. 
Set against that, however, are anecdotal accounts of people being 
stopped in the street by a stranger to be told, for example, ‘they must be 
the sister of X’. The key difference here may be that, by definition, the 
observer already knows person X, where the previous studies make a 
point of ensuring that the participants do not know the people depicted 
in the photographs shown. The reason is not stated, but it would ensure 
that they don’t already know the answer. There has been no reported 
study of the effects of knowing the to-be-matched person, e.g. knowing 
the child to be matched to one of three unknown parents. 
The hypothesis to be tested in this experiment is that it will be easier 
to identify the relative of a known face, because it ‘looks like’ the known 
person. Yet there are reasons to think that it may be harder, because of 
the phenomenon of categorical perception. This was demonstrated for 
faces by Beale and Keil (1995), who produced morphed sequences be-
tween two familiar or unfamiliar faces. They asked people to rate the 
similarity of pairs of images 20% apart in the morph sequence and found 
that there was a step change across the mid point for famous pairs, but 
not for unfamiliar ones. The notion is that a familiar face has a sharp 
decision boundary, outside of which is a different identity. Subsequent 
work has queried the lack of categorical perception for unfamiliar faces, 
with Levin and Beale (2000) suggesting that the categories can be 
learned quite quickly. Kikutani, Roberson, and Hanley (2008) found 
categorical perception only when unfamiliar face endpoints were given 
names, while Angeli, Davidoff, and Valentine (2008) suggested that 
details of experimental design and distinctiveness of the faces would 
affect the extent to which categorical perception is found with unfa-
miliar faces. All agree, however, that categorical perception with 
familiar faces is unequivocal and it therefore seems possible that 
someone unfamiliar with our faces would be better able to see similar-
ities, as the perceived difference between the faces would be less. Simi-
larly, Dwyer and Vladeanu (2009) argue that learning a face is explicitly 
aided by comparison with, and therefore differentiation from, similar 
faces. Again, this would suggest that familiarity with a face would make 
it easier to be sure that the relative is a different person but says nothing 
about identifying the resemblance. 
Note, however, that the task is very different for those familiar with 
one of the faces and those who are not. When familiar with the parents, 
the task becomes identifying the people depicted and then deciding 
which of them the child looks more like, based on pre-existing knowl-
edge of their appearance. When unfamiliar with any of those depicted, 
the participant must rely on identifying physical similarities between the 
faces. Clutterbuck and Johnston (2004) have shown that increasing fa-
miliarity with a face shortens the time required to match two images of 
the same face and propose that matching ability might be a useful index 
of familiarity. Here we have two different, but possibly related faces and 
it is therefore of interest to see what the effect of familiarity is on 
identifying family resemblances. 
In this study, participants attempted to identify which of two target 
people was related to a third, who was in fact a first degree relative of 
one. They also rated the similarity of each target to the relative. The 
target faces were either members of staff or final year psychology stu-
dents. The participants were first, final year or postgraduate students. 
The expectation was that the first year students, freshly arrived at the 
time of the study, would know very few of the staff and even fewer final 
year students, whereas the final year students would know most of the 
staff and many of their contemporaries. The prediction is that, being 
more familiar with the targets, the final year students would perform 
better on the matching task and give higher match ratings to related 
individuals. However, it is also plausible that the final year students 
would perform better for being more motivated, or simply better prac-
tised at doing psychology experiments. So a third group of students was 
added, postgraduates in the department. This postgraduate sample will 
know most of the staff, but few of the final year students. Thus, their 
performance is expected to be similar to that of the final year students on 
the staff image set, but like the first years on the final year set. 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Materials 
Members of staff of the psychology department and final year 
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psychology students were asked to provide pictures of themselves 
(referred to as targets) and their first-degree relatives – parents, siblings 
or children. These were deliberately ‘ambient’ images, the better to 
reflect natural face processing abilities. We obtained 14 such pairs for 
the staff set and 18 for the final year set. If not already digital these were 
scanned. The images were cropped and presented at 280 × 400 pixels, 
about 8 × 11 cm on screen. 
2.1.2. Participants 
Thirty-five first year psychology students took part in return for 
course credit: 3 were dropped due to not following instructions, leaving 
22 female, 10 male, mean age 18.7 years. Fifteen final year students, 11 
female, mean age 22.1, and 16 research postgraduates, 15 female, mean 
age 31.1, from the psychology department took part voluntarily. 
2.1.3. Design 
Dependent variables are proportion correct for matching, with 0.5 
being chance and 1.0 perfect; and similarity rating on a scale from 1 to 7 
for related and unrelated individuals. There are three participant 
groups: first year, final year and postgraduate. 
2.1.4. Procedure 
The staff and undergraduate photo sets were shown separately, with 
order of presentation of the two sets alternated. Participants were shown 
a relative photograph at the top of the screen, and two potential targets 
at the bottom. They were told the top image would be the sibling, parent 
or child of one of the bottom two. Pairs of potential relatives were 
defined at set up, choosing foils from among the set that looked plau-
sible, having a similar general appearance. Each target photograph 
therefore appeared twice, always in the same pair, once with a correct 
match and once without, though participants were not told this. Order of 
presentation of the triplets was randomized by Eprime. Participants 
were allowed as long as they wished to make a decision. When they had 
completed all triplets, they were then asked to rate the similarity of each 
pair of target and relative faces, on a scale from 1 to 7. Each target face 
was rated twice, once for resemblance to its true relative and once for 
the non-relative with which it had been presented in the first stage. The 
photographs to be rated were presented side by side, again with no time 
limit for response. Participants were then asked whether or not they 
knew each of the targets (i.e. the staff or undergraduate pictures) and 
finally whether they already knew the match between target and rela-
tive (e.g. because they had seen a photograph by a desk). When they had 
completed the first set, they were shown the second, with identical 
procedure. 
2.1.5. Analysis 
Linear mixed effect (LME) modelling for all experiments was carried 
out using R (R Core Team, 2021) and the packages lme4 (Bates, Mächler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2015) and lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & 
Christensen, 2017). For all models, both participants and images were 
entered as random factors, allowing variable intercepts and slopes with 
respect to the key variable of resemblance. For experiments 2 and 3, the 
full model is singular, indicating a lack of meaningful data for the 
random slopes. The equivalent models without random slopes are re-
ported in supplementary analyses; the results are qualitatively identical. 
2.2. Results 
Where participants reported knowing that a pair was related, the 
responses for both that pair and the other triplet with the same target 
photograph were removed from the data. Thus if someone knew that 
John was Paul’s son, then that response was removed, as was the 
response to the other occasion that Paul appeared, this time as a foil 
target. This was done in case participants realised that each target per-
son appeared twice and therefore logically could not be related to the 
relative in the second case. This was probably unnecessarily 
conservative: participants were not told that each target would appear 
twice and in any case responses to the case where the target appeared as 
a foil before the veridical pairing would be unlikely to be affected. In 
fact, the incidence of such knowledge was low, and only 12 cases had to 
be removed, all from postgraduate participants evaluating the staff 
target set. 
Three of the first year participants were removed, since they claimed 
to know almost all of the targets, both staff and final year. It seems likely 
they were thinking that the identity check was a memory test and 
correctly asserting that they had seen the images in the first part of the 
study. Table 1 shows the average recognition of the targets for each of 
the participant groups. As expected, the first year students knew very 
few of the target identities in either image set, the final year sample 
knew about half of both, while the postgraduate sample knew most of 
the staff targets but very few final years. 
Fig. 1 shows the proportion of correct matches of relative to target 
for the two different target sets. It is apparent that performance is better 
in the staff set, but the two sets were in no way equated for difficulty and 
are not directly comparable. The pattern between groups is as expected; 
postgraduates and final years do better than first years on the staff set, 
while final years do better than the other two groups on the final year 
set. Analysis by group using ANOVA, confirming this pattern, is reported 
in supplementary analyses. 
To enter all the data in a single analysis, an LME model was used to 
test the effect of knowing the target on matching accuracy. The results, 
summarised in Table 2a, indicate a highly significant effect of knowing 
the target, with an increase in proportion correct of 0.13, Fig. 2a. 
Fig. 2b shows the similarity ratings for the two target groups. It is 
apparent that the related pairs are rated as more similar than the un-
related ones but that there is an effect of knowing the target only when 
the pairs match (ie are actually related). The similarity ratings were also 
analysed by an LME with fixed factors of whether the target was known, 
whether the pair of faces was a match and the interaction between these 
factors. The results, in Table 2b, show the expected large effect of 
whether the pair are related (the similarity rating is 0.92 higher on 
average when they are). Overall, there is a small negative effect of 
knowing the target, qualified by a highly significant interaction such 
that the similarity rating is on average 0.81 higher when the target is 
known and the pair are a match. 
2.3. Discussion 
As predicted, familiarity with the target facilitates recognition of 
family resemblance. While the experiment was designed as a between 
groups study and is analysed as such in supplementary analyses, the use 
of an LME allows focus on the key variable, namely whether a particular 
participant knows a particular target. Such familiarity results in a large 
increase in matching accuracy and an increase in rated similarity for 
related pairs. That there is a small negative affect of familiarity on 
overall similarity score indicates that there is some tendency for a 
familiar target to look less like an unrelated face. 
There is a possibility, however, that since the similarity rating fol-
lowed the matching decision, the one affected the other. That is, when 
assessing similarity, a participant might remember their decision that 
the pair now presented either were or were not a match and change their 
rating, perhaps subconsciously. A further experiment with the two de-
cisions made by different groups of participants would be required to 
rule this possibility out. 
The LME estimated the intercept, i.e. the matching performance for 
Table 1 
Percentage of each target group reported to be known by each participant group.  
Participant group First year Final Year Postgraduate 
Final year targets 0.9% 41.3% 5.4% 
Staff targets 1.8% 47.3% 76.6%  
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unfamiliar faces, to be 0.65, better than chance, but not by much, 
consistent with previous studies using unfamiliar faces discussed above. 
Familiarity raised this to 0.78, significantly higher. Ratings of similarity 
followed the same pattern for truly related pairs, with increased rated 
similarity when familiar with the targets. 
A possible explanation for the data is that the familiar participants 
knew more of the relatives than they reported. When asked, they might 
believe the answer to be no, while in fact having some memory of having 
met the relative, or of having seen their photograph. It would be very 
hard to control for this completely. One approach might be to do away 
with genuine familiarity at all, and do an experiment where participants 
are first familiarised with half of the targets in some way. It is an open 
question as to whether such rapid familiarisation would produce the 
effects reported here. 
Nonetheless, these data are consistent with the islands of expertise 
proposal. While categorical processing of familiar faces (Beale & Keil, 
1995) suggests that a relative’s face might look more different from the 
target to someone familiar with them, the data show an increased ability 
to detect the underlying resemblance. This can be explained, at a surface 
level, by the difference in the task. Those unfamiliar with the faces have 
to resort to face matching, while those familiar can first identify the 
targets and then use their existing knowledge of the faces to decide 
which the relative most resembles. This is despite the third ‘relative’ face 
being unfamiliar to all participants. Familiarity with the target allows 
the underlying similarities to be perceived. 
The next two experiments test whether this advantage might also 
apply to a recognition task where the study items are previously unfa-
miliar faces. Where a particular study item resembles a known face, does 
that enhance subsequent recognition (Experiment 2) and does identifi-
cation of the resemblance have to be conscious (Experiment 3)? 
3. Experiment 2 
In a typical test of unfamiliar face memory, participants are shown a 
set of faces and asked to make some decision about them, such as how 
distinctive they are. After some distractor task, they are shown a bigger 
set of faces, some of which show identities seen at study, and asked to 
decide which are new and which old. How successfully a given identity 
is recognised will depend on a variety of factors, such as how distinctive 
it is (Wickham, Morris, & Fritz, 2000). For familiar faces, the underlying 
process is very different. At study, a face will produce a recognition 
response, which may include a name or other semantic information. At 
test, assuming the new picture is also recognised, the task becomes one 
of whether person X was seen at study, rather than having to match the 
facial appearance to study items. So, what if an unfamiliar face happens 
to resemble someone who is already known, for example, your friend 
John? If the resemblance is strong enough to generate a name, then it 
seems plausible that the same semantic processing will operate. The 
prediction, then, is that unfamiliar study faces that a participant thinks 
look like someone they know will be better remembered at test. Since 
everyone knows a different set of faces, we would expect each partici-
pant to remember different faces. This might account for some of the 
otherwise unexplained variance between individuals in typical face 
recognition studies. 
A secondary aspect of this experiment was to test possible differences 
caused by using the same or different images at study and test. If the 
same image is used at study and test, there is the possibility of doing the 
task by image recognition. Even matching two different images of the 
same face is surprisingly difficult (Bruce et al., 1999). Using a different 
image at study and test is thought to require more specific face pro-
cessing. It is therefore possible that, if there is an effect of prior famil-
iarity on the ability to remember a face, this will show more strongly 
when the image is different, since both processes require deep face 
processing. Consider the same image condition: at study, a participant 
may think, that image looks like Fred. At test, the same image appears, 
and they can see it is the image that looked like Fred so they may be 
more confident in their response. The different image condition should 
on average be harder, precisely because the image is different, therefore 
there is more room for improvement. So what might be the effects of 
resemblance to a known identity? Different pictures of an individual 
Fig. 1. Matching performance by each of the three participant groups on the 
two target sets. Error bars are standard errors. 
Table 2 
Summary of LME results for Experiment1.   
Estimate (Standard 
error) 
t-value (Approx df) p-value 
a) Proportion correct 
Intercept 0.65 (0.034) 19.21 (37.98) <0.001 
Know target 0.13 (0.027) 4.95(29.06) <0.001  
b) Similarity rating 
Intercept 3.45 (0.12) 28.39 (79.91) <0.001 
Know target − 0.24 (0.12) − 2.04 (70.52) 0.045 
Match 0.92 (0.049) 18.78 (4242) <0.001 
Match × Know target 0.81 (0.10) 7.89 (4193) <0.001  
Fig. 2. a) Effect of knowing the target on proportion correct, b) Effect of knowing the target on similarity rating of match and mismatched pairs. Error bars are 
standard errors by items. 
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vary in how good a likeness they are thought to be (Mileva, Young, 
Kramer, & Burton, 2019; Ritchie, Kramer, & Burton, 2018). It follows 
that different images of an unfamiliar face will vary in how much they 
resemble some other, already familiar individual. The study picture 
might look like Fred; the test image may look less, or more, like Fred. 
This can be expected to add variance to any effect but it is unclear how 
the different factors may affect the effect size. 
The experiment reported here was part of a larger study that 
involved eye-tracking participants while they undertook three different 
tasks; a memory study, a matching study and a composite task (Richler, 
Mack, Gauthier, & Palmeri, 2009). Only the behavioural results from the 
memory study are presented here. 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
Thirty students, mean age 22 (SD = 6.2), 4 male, 24 female, 2 other, 
from the University of Stirling took part in return for course credit. 
3.1.2. Materials 
The face images used came from a set collected at the University of 
Surrey. Two different frontal images were chosen of each of 60 people, 
half male. The photographs were taken some weeks apart, enough for 
obvious differences in hair length or style, or the emergence of facial 
hair. The images were divided into 4 sets of 30, each containing half the 
identities, with different sets for the two photographs of each identity. 
Counterbalancing allowed both images of all the identities to be used in 
turn as study items. Images were loosely cropped within an oval to 
remove any clothing and presented in colour at 283 × 371 pixels on a 
Tobii 1750 eye tracker which has a 17 in. monitor at 1280 × 1024 
resolution. 
3.1.3. Procedure 
Participants first completed the study phase of the memory experi-
ment. They were shown 15 male and 15 female faces and asked to rate 
each on a resemblance scale of 1–7 how much the face reminded them of 
someone they knew, either personally or by being famous. Faces stayed 
on screen until response. The order of the faces was randomized for each 
participant. 
Participants then completed 40 trials of a split face holistic pro-
cessing task, which took about 3 min. They then completed 30 trials of 
an inverted version of the Glasgow Face Matching Task (Burton, White, 
& McNeill, 2010), which again took about 3 min. Both these tasks use 
monochrome images and are therefore unlikely to cause much inter-
ference with the memory study. They are not discussed further here. 
The recognition stage of the memory study followed. Participants 
saw pictures of 30 previously unseen identities and the 30 seen at study. 
Of these, half showed the identical picture, while the other half showed a 
new, unseen image. Participants were asked to respond to each with a 
score from 1 to 7, where 1 was certain they had not seen that identity at 
study, 7 was certain they had and 4 was completely uncertain as to 
whether they had. 
3.2. Results 
Of interest here is whether participants better remembered faces 
they thought looked like someone they already knew. Since each 
participant knows different people, the analysis has to be by items, 
comparing the memorability of a face when it looked familiar with when 
it did not. One participant was omitted from analysis, since they only 
ever responded either 1 or 7 to the resemblance question. Since there 
were very few resemblance ratings of 6 and 7, they were combined into 
one group for analysis. The key dependent variable is the recognition 
confidence rating at test given to items that were in the study set, 
referred to as hit confidence. 
Fig. 3 shows the relationship between the rated resemblance at study 
and the confidence of recognition at test. It is apparent that the confi-
dence ratings for the same images are far higher than for different im-
ages but that both show the same upward slope with rated resemblance. 
In fact the lines of best fit have identical slopes of 0.20 increase in hit 
confidence for each step in resemblance. Note that the bottom end of the 
different image line, for a resemblance of 1, is below 4, which indicates a 
tendency to think they were unseen at study. For comparison, the 
average recognition score for the truly unseen images is 2.11, signifi-
cantly lower (paired t-test by subjects, t(29) = 13.9, p < .001). Partici-
pants are able to do the task, if not very confidently. 
An LME with random factors for participant and image, and fixed 
factors of resemblance and image type at test (same/different), 
confirmed a large effect of image type, a highly significant effect of 
resemblance and no interaction between them (Table 3). The estimate of 
the effect of a unit change in resemblance on hit confidence from the 
more sophisticated analysis is slightly lower, at 0.18. 
3.3. Discussion 
The data showed the predicted effect of resemblance, with an almost 
monotonic increase in hit confidence with strength of resemblance. It 
seems that, if a face consciously reminds a participant of someone 
familiar, then they are better able to recognise the same identity later. 
The surprising finding is that the slope is identical for the same and 
different image conditions. In truth, it is surprising that the relationship 
is so linear at all, given that both the resemblance and recognition 
variables are really ordinal. In the introduction to this experiment, 
various factors were identified that might affect the effect size in the 
different image condition. The recognition task is harder, allowing more 
room for improvement and requiring more face processing, as opposed 
to superficial image matching. Image variability is likely also to affect 
how strongly a given image resembles a known identity and in turn, the 
size of any familiarity benefit. It seems that any overall change in the 
effect size is too small to be detected here. 
A limitation of Experiment 2 is that participants were prompted to 
consider whether each study face resembled anybody they know. This 
prompt is likely to cause participants to form associations between study 
faces and known faces that the participant themselves would not 
generate spontaneously. The idea of islands of expertise would be more 
significant if there is an effect of resemblance when not overtly 
conscious of it. This might be possible if the improved performance is 
not only due to overt semantic associations (that face looks like X) but 
also to improved resolution in the ‘face space’ near a known identity. It 
Fig. 3. Hit confidence at test against resemblance rating at study. Circles, same 
image at test, triangles, different image at test, each with a best linear fit line, 
dotted. Error bars are standard errors by items. 
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isn’t possible to tell people not to think about resemblance at study, 
since doing so would have precisely the opposite effect. They can be 
asked about some other characteristic, without saying anything about 
resemblance beforehand, then asked after the test phase whether each 
face reminds them of anyone. That forms the basis of Experiment 3, 
where participants were asked to rate faces for trustworthiness at study, 
unprompted about resemblance. They then completed a second memory 
experiment with a different set of faces, where they were prompted to 
think about resemblance at study. 
4. Experiment 3 
4.1. Method 
4.1.1. Participants 
Forty-four students at the University of Stirling, mean age 20 (SD =
2.2), 16 male, 28 female, took part voluntarily. They were told only that 
it was a study of factors affecting the recognition of faces. 
4.1.2. Materials 
Ninety-six pairs of images were selected from the Glasgow unfamiliar 
faces database (Burton et al., 2010), half male. The C1 set were used for 
study items and the DV set for test. These images are taken in the same 
sitting, one using a camera, the other being a still taken from a digital 
video. 
4.1.3. Procedure 
The overall experiment consists of two memory tests, using different 
sets of face images. In the first study phase, participants were shown 24 
face images, one at a time, and asked to rate them for perceived trust-
worthiness on a scale from 1 to 5, labelled as not, slightly, moderately, 
very and completely trustworthy. The faces were all male or all female, 
counterbalanced by participant number. They were then shown a dis-
tractor video of cute puppies for 30 s, before the test phase. They were 
presented with 48 face images, half showing identities from the study 
phase, and asked to indicate whether they had seen that person before, 
on a scale from 1 to 6. These response options were labelled as certain 
no, think no, guess no, guess yes, think yes and certain yes. This differs 
from the 7 point scale used in Experiment 2 in omitting the central ‘don’t 
know’ response and forcing participants to make a decision. Following 
the test phase, participants were shown the study images again, one at a 
time, and asked whether the face reminded them of anyone they knew, 
either personally or as a celebrity, on a scale from 1 to 5. These response 
options were labelled as 1) does not remind me of anyone, 2) slight, 3) 
moderate, 4) distinct resemblance and 5) looks very like someone I 
know. The scale was shorter than that used in Experiment 2 as the 7 
point scale there was used sparsely. 
This was followed by another study phase, using the opposite sex set. 
This time, participants were asked about resemblance at study, using the 
same prompt and response scale. Another distractor video was followed 
by the final test phase, differing from the first only in the sex of the image 
set. 
4.2. Results 
Fig. 4 shows the hit confidence at test for studied faces, averaged by 
items for both prompt conditions. It is apparent that there is a general 
increase in hit confidence with resemblance rating whether or not par-
ticipants were prompted to think about resemblance. An LME with 
participants and images as random factors, and resemblance and prompt 
condition as fixed factors, reported in Table 3, confirms significant ef-
fects of both resemblance and prompt and the interaction between them. 
It is noteworthy that the effect of prompt is negative (Table 3), 
estimated at − 0.4, while in Fig. 4 the line for prompted lies above that 
for unprompted everywhere except for resemblance level 1. This is 
because the majority of responses are at resemblance level 1; relatively 
few of the images reminded participants of anyone. The model identifies 
that the average effect of the prompt is to reduce hit confidence, with the 
interaction indicating a higher effect of resemblance when prompted to 
think about it. 
Since the aim of this experiment was to assess whether there would 
be an effect of resemblance if unprompted about it at study, Table 3 also 
reports an LME for only the first, unprompted part of the experiment. 
This confirms a highly significant effect of resemblance, estimated at 
0.16 on the confidence scale per step of resemblance. 
4.2.1. Trustworthiness 
There have been reports that trustworthiness may affect the memo-
rability of faces (Felisberti & Pavey, 2010). Here, no effects were found 
(LME in supplementary analysis). 
4.2.2. Study time 
A possible issue of concern is that differences between parts 1 and 2 
are caused by the amount of time participants spent studying each face. 
If they spent longer studying faces when assessing resemblance, that 
might explain the bigger effect at test. A paired samples t-test showed 
that the time spent assessing trustworthiness in part 1 (M = 3077 ms) 
was significantly longer than the time to assess resemblance in part 2 (M 
= 2319 ms, t(43) = − 3.72, p = .001). This cannot therefore explain the 
bigger effect of resemblance in part 2. 
4.3. Discussion 
Participants were better at recognising new pictures of someone that 
reminded them of an already familiar face. Prompting participants to 
Table 3 
Summary of LME results for Experiments 2 and 3.  





Intercept 3.49 (0.26) 13.57 (59.15) <0.001 
Resemblance 0.18 (0.067) 2.77 (56.61) 0.0076 
Image type 1.35 (0.25) 5.35 (821.2) <0.001 
Resemblance x Image 
type 
− 0.028 (0.081) − 0.34 (782.9) 0.73  
Experiment 3 full model 
Intercept 3.91 (0.14) 28.81 (110.5) <0.001 
Resemblance 0.15 (0.04) 3.43 (1482) <0.001 
Prompt − 0.40 (0.13) − 3.03 (2040) 0.002 
Resemblance x Prompt 0.16 (0.06) 2.57 (1962) 0.01  
Experiment 3 unprompted only 
Intercept 3.90 (0.13) 29.40 (50.96) <0.001 
Resemblance 0.16 (0.047) 3.36 (83.97) 0.0012  
Fig. 4. Experiment 3 hit confidence scores for studied faces, from part 1, un-
prompted, and part 2, prompted about resemblance at study. Error bars are 
standard errors by items. 
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think about resemblance at study produced a larger effect, though there 
was a robust effect when unprompted. This suggests that there may be 
two components to the effect. One is an overt, conscious process where 
the resemblance is identified and the participant actively considers the 
likeness to the known face. The other may be unconscious, with the 
novel face merely ‘looking familiar’. 
This sense of general familiarity was termed ‘context free familiarity’ 
in early experiments on the memorability of faces. Vokey and Read 
(1988) also asked their participants about whether faces in a memory 
study reminded them of someone they knew. However, they averaged 
this familiarity across participants and concluded it had rather little 
effect on recognition. They comment that this is probably because 
people know different faces. Had they analysed their data by items, as 
here, they may have uncovered an effect of resemblance. 
An unexpected result is the overall decrease in hit confidence when 
participants are prompted to think about resemblance at study. This 
effect is driven by the lower confidence when the faces did not resemble 
anyone. One possible explanation is related to task demands, whereby 
asking people to think about resemblance at study causes them to pay 
less attention to those faces that do not resemble anyone. Alternatively, 
they may be actively using resemblance at test and tending to reject 
faces that do not remind them of anyone as being unseen. If so, then 
previously unseen test faces (foils) that resemble a familiar face might be 
less confidently rejected, a prediction for future study, since resem-
blance information was collected here only for study items. 
5. An outline computational explanation 
How might these effects of resemblance manifest themselves 
computationally? This section illustrates one possibility with reference 
to the Lewis Face-space-R model (Lewis, 2004), which is a formalisation 
of some aspects of the more generic face space proposals of Valentine 
(1991). Valentine’s model postulated that faces are represented as lo-
cations in a multi-dimensional space. The nature and number of the 
dimensions is clearly of interest but also remains unclear. Busey (1998) 
obtained similarity ratings on a set of faces of bald men and then used 
multi-dimensional scaling to generate six dimensions: age; race; facial 
adiposity (plumpness); facial hair; aspect ratio (short-fat/long-thin); and 
facial hair colour. Shepherd, Ellis, and Davies (1977) used a similar 
method to derive just three dimensions: hair, face shape and age. It is 
clear that while such methods may describe the type of a face, they 
would not serve to distinguish individuals. In fact the dimensions are 
typical of those used during unfamiliar face processing, which is what 
the participants in their studies were doing. Familiar processing must be 
more subtle, since people are able to distinguish very similar faces such 
as ‘identical’ twins. Lewis (2004) obtained an estimate of between 15 
and 22 dimensions. 
Central to Face-space-R is the notion of a learned exemplar unit per 
face identity, whose activation is given by a Gaussian radial basis 
function (Broomhead & Lowe, 1988). That is, the unit’s activation will 
peak when the input face has the correct value on each dimension and 
falls off like the normal distribution curve as the location of the face 
moves away from the optimal. These are a possible instantiation of the 
Face Recognition Units (FRUs) in the box model of Bruce and Young 
(1986), All the exemplar units (one per known identity) respond to some 
(perhaps vanishingly small) extent when a face is input and a competi-
tion between them decides which is the closest. 
Fig. 5 shows a simple, one dimensional illustration of the basic 
coding mechanism of Face-space-R. The x-axis represents some arbitrary 
dimension in face space. There are four known faces depicted, repre-
sented by the four solid lines. Each of these Gaussian curves represents 
the response sensitivity to an input in that location on the x-axis. The 
Gaussians have different widths, reflecting the variability of that face on 
that dimension. The dotted and dashed curves represent face image in-
puts: in Face-space-R, these also appear as a Gaussian shaped zone of 
activation on the dimension. The initial response of each of the four 
known face units depends on the overlap between their response curves 
and the input activation curve. The dashed line corresponds to an un-
familiar face that does not closely resemble any known face. The dotted 
line corresponds to a face that is similar to the left-most of the known 
faces and will therefore produce a response, albeit not as strong as an 
actual image of the known face. 
An explanation for the Experiment 1 data in Face-space-R would be 
that a relative’s face is similar enough, across enough dimensions, to 
cause sufficient activation in the relevant FRU to trigger a sense of fa-
miliarity. If the similarity is strong enough then familiarity might give 
way to false recognition; one sister photograph was sometimes mistaken 
for the person herself. The familiarity signal makes the difference, 
without it the participant is left trying to compare image similarities 
across the various dimensions. 
For Experiments 2 and 3, there are two potential modes of operation. 
If the similarity is close enough to a known face to go above some 
threshold and activate the semantic information for the face (as in, that 
looks like Fred), then that semantic label becomes part of the stored 
memory for the face. If it does not, there will still be a signal from the 
FRU, and the proposal here is that this signal itself becomes part of the 
stored memory of the face. This additional signal makes the difference in 
the unprompted condition of Experiment 3. Provided the test exemplar 
image is similar enough it will generate the same familiarity signal, 
supplementing the stored representation of the appearance of the 
studied face and enhancing recognition accuracy. 
Within the model, the spread (SD of the Gaussian) of the receptive 
field will have a big effect on activation. For simplicity the simulations in 
Lewis (2004) used a fixed SD, but in practice this would surely vary, both 
across the various dimensions for a given face and between different 
faces. As specified, Face-space-R is not a learning model but there would 
have to be a process that adjusts the centres and spread of the radial 
basis functions to match a new identity. Burton, Kramer, Ritchie, and 
Jenkins (2016) present evidence that faces have idiosyncratic modes of 
variation and that part of learning a face is learning how its appearance 
varies. Within the Face-space-R model, this would be accommodated by 
the receptive field having a spread for each dimension that is propor-
tional to the variability that identity shows on that dimension. If genetic 
(or perhaps environmental) relatedness also influences the way in which 
faces vary in appearance (e.g. having similar smiles) it would increase 
the likelihood of a relative’s face generating a familiarity signal. 
6. General discussion 
Familiar face processing is remarkably accurate; given enough 
experience, it is possible to distinguish ‘identical’ twins at a glance. By 
contrast, unfamiliar face processing is effortful and error-prone, even for 
matching different pictures taken at the same time (Bruce et al., 1999). 
Young and Burton (2018) therefore argue that we are truly expert only 
at processing familiar faces. The novel proposal here is that this makes 
familiar faces into ‘islands of expertise’ within the space of possible faces 
and that faces that resemble those we are familiar with should inherit 
some of that expertise. Experiment 1 showed that we are better able to 
identify relatives of familiar people. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that 
we are better able to remember unfamiliar faces that resemble a known 
one, even when not prompted to think about the resemblance at study. 
These findings and the islands of expertise model are supported by 
Fig. 5. A one dimensional illustration of Face-space-R. See text for explanation.  
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Strathie, Hughes-White, and Laurence (2020), work which was promp-
ted by a conference presentation of results from Experiment 1. They use 
famous individuals and their less well known siblings to show that 
participants are better able to identify relatives of familiar faces. With 
their image set, which used unfamiliar Spanish celebrities as the control 
group, this manifested as being less able to identify the related image in 
the unfamiliar condition. Their second experiment reports that it is 
easier to match different pictures of an individual if they are related to 
someone who is already familiar (e.g. two pictures of Brad Pitt’s brother 
Doug). Strathie et al. (2020) go on to show that these structural simi-
larities can be captured in a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
model. Face images are better reconstructed from a PCA model derived 
from images of their sibling than are unrelated identities. The implica-
tion is that siblings share some common variability in appearance which 
both humans and a PCA model can identify. 
One of the findings of the first experiment is that similarity ratings 
increase with familiarity for the correct pair but are little affected for the 
incorrect pairs. A possible explanation, in terms of the Face-space-R 
analysis presented above, is that similarity judgements are largely car-
ried out in the featural domain of unfamiliar face processing. That is, 
given this task, participants estimate the resemblance of features and 
general characteristics, such as face shape. However, with the correct 
pair, the relative’s face may provoke some response in the face recog-
nition unit for the known target face, adding a sense of familiarity to 
boost the similarity estimate. For the incorrect pairing, the relative face 
will not cause any such activation and the more basic feature matching 
holds sway. Knowledge of the target face has little effect on the 
perceived dissimilarity of the relative’s face. Lorusso, Brelstaff, Brodo, 
Lagorio, and Grosso (2011) suggest that judgement of similarity and 
dissimilarity may be different processes. This is consistent with the 
observation from face matching studies that performance on hits and 
false positives do not correlate (Megreya & Burton, 2006). Some people 
do well at telling faces apart, others at telling them together; the two 
abilities seem to be largely independent. It may be that the added fa-
miliarity signal that derives from an unfamiliar face resembling a known 
one helps with matching but not so much with rejecting mismatches. 
This is consistent with the results from Strathie et al. (2020) where fa-
miliarity effects are shown only in the matching conditions. 
The island of expertise model offers a potential explanation for the 
abilities of ‘super-recognizers’ (Russell, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2009): 
individuals with face recognition performance more than two standard 
deviations above average. Someone who naturally has markedly better 
face recognition than average will tend to learn and remember more 
faces. This will populate their face space, such that a novel face will 
more often resemble one that is already known. This will in turn make 
the novel face more memorable, bootstrapping the process so that their 
abilities continue to grow. When the space is sufficiently populated, the 
internal process might work like triangulating a radio source: a resem-
blance to more than one known face allowing a more precise fix on the 
appearance of the novel face and its likely variability. This would further 
improve the resolution and accuracy of processing of unfamiliar faces. In 
common with typical participants, super-recognizers show an ‘other 
race’ deficit (Bate et al., 2019; Robertson, Black, Chamberlain, Megreya, 
& Davis, 2020), albeit still performing better than controls. While their 
intrinsic face processing ability still helps, they lose the advantage 
afforded by already knowing many similar-looking people. They have 
fewer islands of expertise for less familiar facial types. At the other end 
of the scale, people with well below average recognition learn relatively 
few faces and would rarely benefit from prior resemblance. 
A prediction from the results of Experiment 3 is that different par-
ticipants should consistently remember different faces within a set. This 
would require retesting the same participants using the same identities 
(possibly using different photographs) some time apart. Quite how long 
apart would be hard to judge; individuals with good memory for faces 
might be able to recall the previous test if it is done too soon. This would 
confound the results since a face that was, for whatever reason, 
memorable the first time would be likely to stick in the memory better. 
7. Conclusion 
A variety of experimental evidence suggests that we are truly expert 
only in the faces that we know well (Young & Burton, 2018). The three 
experiments reported here suggest that some of this enhanced expertise 
extends to faces that resemble known identities. That relatively few 
faces provoke a ‘resemblance’ response suggests that, for most of us, our 
internal ‘face space’ is sparsely filled, otherwise every new face would be 
well coded in terms of those we already know. 
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Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear mixed-effects 
models using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67(1), 1–48. https://doi.org/ 
10.18637/jss.v067.i01. 
Beale, J. M., & Keil, F. C. (1995). Categorical effects in the perception of faces. Cognition, 
57(3), 217–239. 
Bredart, S., & French, R. M. (1999). Do babies resemble their fathers more than their 
mothers? A failure to replicate Christenfeld and Hill (1995). Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 20(2), 129–135. 
Bressan, P., & Dal Martello, M. F. (2002). Talis pater, talis filius: Perceived resemblance 
and the belief in genetic relatedness. Psychological Science, 13(3), 213–218. 
Bressan, P., & Grassi, M. (2004). Parental resemblance in 1-year-olds and the Gaussian 
curve. Evolution and Human Behavior, 25(3), 133–141. 
Broomhead, D. S., & Lowe, D. (1988). Multivariable functional interpolation and 
adaptive networks. Complex Systems, 2, 321–355. 
Bruce, V., Henderson, Z., Greenwood, K., Hancock, P. J. B., Burton, A. M., & Miller, P. I. 
(1999). Verification of face identities from images captured on video. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Applied, 5(4), 339–360. 
Bruce, V., & Young, A. (1986). Understanding face recognition. British Journal of 
Psychology, 77(3), 305–327. 
P.J.B. Hancock                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Cognition 214 (2021) 104765
9
Burton, A. M., Kramer, R. S. S., Ritchie, K. L., & Jenkins, R. (2016). Identity from 
variation: Representations of faces derived from multiple instances. Cognitive Science, 
40(1), 202–223. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12231. 
Burton, A. M., White, D., & McNeill, A. (2010). The Glasgow face matching test. Behavior 
Research Methods, 42(1), 286–291. 
Burton, A. M., Wilson, S., Cowan, M., & Bruce, V. (1999). Face recognition in poor- 
quality video: Evidence from security surveillance. Psychological Science, 10(3), 
243–248. 
Busey, T. A. (1998). Physical and psychological representations of faces: Evidence from 
morphing. Psychological Science, 9(6), 476–483. 
Carey, S. (1992). Becoming a face expert. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London. Series B: Biological Sciences, 335(1273), 95–103. https://doi.org/10.1098/ 
rstb.1992.0012. 
Christenfeld, N. J. S., & Hill, E. A. (1995). Whose baby are you. Nature, 378(6558), 669. 
Clutterbuck, R., & Johnston, R. A. (2004). Matching as an index of face familiarity. Visual 
Cognition, 11(7), 857–869. 
Curby, K. M., & Gauthier, I. (2009). The temporal advantage for individuating objects of 
expertise: Perceptual expertise is an early riser. Journal of Vision, 9(6), 7. https://doi. 
org/10.1167/9.6.7. 
Dal Martello, M. F., & Maloney, L. T. (2006). Where are kin recognition signals in the 
human face? Journal of Vision, 6(12), 2. https://doi.org/10.1167/6.12.2. 
Dwyer, D. M., & Vladeanu, M. (2009). Perceptual learning in face processing: 
Comparison facilitates face recognition. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
62(10), 2055–2067. 
Felisberti, F. M., & Pavey, L. (2010). Contextual modulation of biases in face recognition. 
PLoS One, 5(9), Article e12939. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0012939. 
Gauthier, I., Skudlarski, P., Gore, J., & Anderson, A. (2000). Expertise for cars and birds 
recruits brain areas involved in face recognition. Nature Neuroscience, 3(2), 191–197. 
Hancock, P. J. B., Bruce, V., & Burton, A. M. (2000). Recognition of unfamiliar faces. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(9), 330–337. 
Hole, G. J. (1994). Configurational factors in the perception of unfamiliar faces. 
Perception, 23(1), 65–74. https://doi.org/10.1068/p230065. 
Johnston, R. A., & Edmonds, A. J. (2009). Familiar and unfamiliar face recognition: A 
review. Memory, 17(5), 577–596. 
Kikutani, M., Roberson, D., & Hanley, J. R. (2008). What’s in the name? Categorical 
perception for unfamiliar faces can occur through labeling. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 15(4), 787–794. 
Kuznetsova, A., Brockhoff, P. B., & Christensen, R. H. B. (2017). lmerTest package: Tests 
in linear mixed effects models. Journal of Statistical Software, 82(1), 1–26. https:// 
doi.org/10.18637/jss.v082.i13. 
Levin, D. T., & Beale, J. M. (2000). Categorical perception occurs in newly learned faces, 
other-race faces, and inverted faces. Perception-and-Psychophysics, 62(2), 386–401. 
Lewis, M. B. (2004). Face-space-R: Towards a unified account of face recognition. Visual 
Cognition, 11(1), 29–69. 
Lorusso, L., Brelstaff, G., Brodo, L., Lagorio, A., & Grosso, E. (2011). Visual judgments of 
kinship: An alternative perspective. Perception, 40(11), 1282–1289. https://doi.org/ 
10.1068/p6916. 
Mclain, D. K., Setters, D., Moulton, M. P., & Pratt, A. E. (2000). Ascription of resemblance 
of newborns by parents and nonrelatives. Evolution and Human Behavior, 21(1), 
11–23. 
Megreya, A. M., & Burton, A. M. (2006). Unfamiliar faces are not faces: Evidence from a 
matching task. Memory & Cognition, 34(4), 865–876. 
Mileva, M., Young, A. W., Kramer, R. S. S., & Burton, A. M. (2019). Understanding facial 
impressions between and within identities. Cognition, 190, 184–198. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.cognition.2019.04.027. 
Nesse, R. M., Silverman, A., & Bortz, A. (1990). Sex-differences in ability to recognize 
family resemblance. Ethology and Sociobiology, 11(1), 11–21. 
Oda, R., Matsumoto-Oda, A., & Kurashima, O. (2005). Effects of belief in genetic 
relatedness on resemblance judgements by Japanese raters. Evolution and Human 
Behavior, 26(5), 441–450. 
R Core Team. (2021). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. Vienna, 
Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.  
Rhodes, G., Hayward, W. G., & Winkler, C. (2006). Expert face coding: Configural and 
component coding of own-race and other-race faces. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
13(3), 499–505. 
Richler, J. J., Mack, M. L., Gauthier, I., & Palmeri, T. J. (2009). Holistic processing of 
faces happens at a glance. Vision Research, 49(23), 2856–2861. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.visres.2009.08.025. 
Ritchie, K. L., Kramer, R. S. S., & Burton, A. M. (2018). What makes a face photo a “good 
likeness”? Cognition, 170, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.09.001. 
Robertson, D. J., Black, J., Chamberlain, B., Megreya, A. M., & Davis, J. P. (2020). Super- 
Recognisers show an advantage for other race face identification. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 34(1), 205–216. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3608. 
Russell, R., Duchaine, B. C., & Nakayama, K. (2009). Super-recognizers: People with 
extraordinary face recognition ability. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(2), 
252–257. https://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.16.2.252. 
Saether, L., & Laeng, B. (2008). On facial expertise: Processing strategies of twins’ 
parents. Perception, 37(8), 1227–1240. 
Shepherd, J. W., Ellis, H. D., & Davies, G. M. (1977). Perceiving and remembering faces. 
Home Office.  
Strathie, A., Hughes-White, N., & Laurence, S. (2020). The sibling familiarity effect: Is 
within-person facial variability shared across siblings? PsyArXiv. https://doi.org/ 
10.31234/osf.io/6j8ek. 
Valentine, T. (1991). A unified account of the effects of distinctiveness, inversion, and 
race in face recognition. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Experimental Psychology, 43A(2), 161–204. 
Vokey, J. R., & Read, J. D. (1988). Typicality, familiarity and the recognition of male and 
female faces. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 42(4), 489–495. 
Wickham, L. H. V., Morris, P. E., & Fritz, C. O. (2000). Facial distinctiveness: Its 
measurement, distribution and influence on immediate and delayed recognition. 
British Journal of Psychology, 91(1), 99–123. https://doi.org/10.1348/ 
000712600161709. 
Young, A. W., & Burton, A. M. (2018). Are we face experts? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
22(2), 100–110. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.11.007. 
P.J.B. Hancock                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
